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A LOAN shark is one who lends comparatively small sums of money
as a business, at high and almost always illegal rates of charge
under conditions which defraud and oppress the borrower. The anti-
thesis of the loan shark is one who supplies credit in small amounts at
reasonable and legal rates of charge under conditions of fair dealing.
Socially, the legitimate lender is the positive pole and the loan shark
the negative one. What promotes one destroys the other.'
Assuring the destruction of the "loan shark" is a problem which
has plagued lawmakers for centuries.
The demand for loans of $1,000 or less is tremendous and
constant. Prior to World War II, demand for small loans came
from the lower income bracket groups, especially from wage-
earners. Since that time, the attitude of many toward debt has
changed. Borrowers wish to enjoy today the benefits of tomorrow's
earnings. Then too, the substantial increase in Texas' industrializa-
tion and population has undoubtedly increased demand in this
area more than elsewhere. Furthermore, the boom since World
War II. rendered the demand effective because small loans are
made primarily on the basis of the margin between wage-earners'
incomes and minimum subsistence costs.'
Such a basis for loans obviously involves a risk to the lender
which neither the borrower nor the lender can control, i.e., the
loss of income resulting from physical disability or death. This
risk is also of concern to the borrower, because either he or his
representative must pay the debt, and he does not want to burden
his family with debts not payable out of income. The use of
credit insurance has found increasing acceptance as a means of
limiting the borrower's liability.'
t For further reference in this field, see Davis, Does the Texas Certificate Plan Act
"Legalize" Usury?, 12 Sw. L.J. 196 (1958); Davis, Does the Hatridge Case "Legalize"
Usury?, 11 Sw. L.J. 433 (1957); Davis, Does the Texas Credit Insurance Act "Legalize"
Usury?, 11 Sw. L.J. 139 (1957).
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas; Representative, District 51, Texas Legislature.
'Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 108 (1941).
2"So long as salaries and wages remained close to the subsistence level, the prospect of
such incomes had no collateral value. When, however, wage-earners' real income rose to the
point where they covered the minimum necessities of life and, at the same time, provided a
surplus for meeting payments of principal and interest on debts, prospective salaries and
wages became assets, however inchoate, against which loans could be made." Nugent, The
Loan Shark Problem, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 4 (1941).
'".. . [A]t the end of 1945, there was approximately $365,000,000 of credit life in-
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Judicial decisions have declared that, in addition to the maximum
interest rate, lenders may charge borrowers for bona fide expenses
incurred on behalf of borrowers" and that reasonable insurance
may be required as security for a loan.' Recognizing a legitimate
business opportunity, some lenders, through their duly licensed
agents, made insurance available to their borrowers at prevailing
rates in amounts approximating the loan liability, giving the bor-
rowers evidence of their protection by the delivery of policies;
and in return for services to the insurance company, the lenders
received reasonable commissions.
The cause for complaint lies not in this, but in the methods
used by illegitimate lenders. These lenders attempted to use in-
surance sales as a device to increase the interest on their loans. The
borrowers were required to purchase insurance through the lenders
and could not secure insurance from other sources. In most instances
premium rates were exorbitant, policies were not delivered to the
borrowers, and the amount of coverage required was unreasonable.
Such frequent practices were cause for legislative concern.
Freedom of the borrower to offer a policy of credit insurance
as security for a loan or to purchase such a policy from the lender
himself, if he wishes, enables a borrower to obtain loans from
ethical lenders at a reasonable interest rate. A regulation which would
prevent giving such security might force the borrower to transact
business with the illegal loan shark who flourishes wherever the
borrower is deprived of the means of obtaining a legal loan. Money
lending involves questions of ethics which render almost impossible
the formulation of permanent and definite criteria of what con-
stitutes a usurious transaction. As long as freedom of contract re-
mains a cornerstone of economic organization,' the state must de-
surance in force in the United States. In eleven short years, that volume of insurance in
force had increased to over $17,000,000,000. At the end of 1945 there were just slightly
over 2,000,000 individuals covered by credit life insurance. At the end of 1956, over
32,000,000 persons were protected . . . [and] in 1956, companies writing credit in-
surance paid death claims of nearly $77,000,000." Peterson, Credit Life Insurance, Vol.
58, No. 9 Best's Insurance News 18 (Life Ed. Jan. 1958).
'Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942); Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex.
190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937); Stuart v. Tenison Bros., 53 S.W. 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899)
error ref.
Rodriguez v. R.P. Youngberg Finance, Ltd., 241 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Texas Finance & Thrift Ass'n v. State, 224 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Restate-
ment, Contracts S 528 (1932).
' One must bear in mind that lenders are not engaged in a common calling in the sense
that they are obligated to lend their money to whomever applies for a loan. They are free
to examine into the integrity, character, financial worth, and security offered by each
applicant for a loan. A lender may refuse to make a loan, or he may require such security
as he deems necessary for his protection. When business judgment demands that the
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termine when a voluntary economic transaction is tainted with
an element of usury.' Texas citizens have long felt that the interest
rate in lending transactions must be regulated to promote the
general welfare.' Recent legislation reflects the conviction that
the establishment of a maximum interest rate alone is not enough,
that it is necessary to regulate expenses which may be charged
and premiums for credit insurance required as security for loans.'
In 1949 the 5 1st Legislature of the State of Texas passed the "Credit
Insurance Act" regulating the writing and use of credit life in-
surance and credit health and accident insurance in connection
with loans not exceeding $1,000. This paper is concerned with
the validity of that legislation, now codified in article 3.53 of the
Texas Insurance Code. This statute will hereinafter be referred to
as the "Credit Insurance Act."
I. THE PROVISIONS OF THE CREDIT INSURANCE ACT-
WHAT IS PERMITTED
The Credit Insurance Act is a detailed, comprehensive regulation
of the sale and use of "credit life insurance" and "credit accident
and health insurance" in which the insured(s) are borrowers
of sums not exceeding $1,000. a The Board of Insurance Commis-
sioners is instructed to make and file a schedule of rates "just and
reasonable" to the insuring public and "adequate" to credit in-
surers." The terms and amount of credit insurance may be regulated
to limit the insurance permitted by the act to "true credit in-
surance.""1 Section 5 prohibits more than one policy on one loan.
collateral securing a loan be insured against loss by casualty, or that a policy of credit life
or accident and health insurance is necessary, there is nothing which prevents a lender from
requiring such security. A lender is not prohibited from refusing to loan money if the
insurance is not obtained and he may make a loan if the borrower obtains, or agrees to
obtain, the required insurance.
'Interpretive Commentary, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Const. art. 16, S 11 (1955).
"The Constitution of the Republic of Texas (1836) had no provision governing inter-
est. In 1840 the Legislature enacted a usury law setting the maximum conventional inter-
est rate at 12% per annum and 8% in the absence of agreement on the rate. 8 Gammel's
Laws of Texas 155 (1898). The 1845 Constitution under which Texas was admitted to the
Union contained no interest provision. The Constitution of 1869 in art. XII, 5 44, pro-
vided for the abolishment of all usury laws, except those relating to interest rates in the
absence of contract, and prohibited legislation on the subject. The present Constitution
(1876) in art. 16, 5 11, formerly set a maximum conventional rate of 12% per annum
and 8% per annum in the absence of contract, making excessive rates usurious. An 1891
amendment lowered these rates to 10% per annum and 6% per annum respectively. The
period between effective dates of the 1869 and the 1876 Constitutions is the only time when
interest rates were not regulated either by constitutional or statutory provisions.
'Tex. Banking Code arts. 342-508 (1947).1OTex. Ins. Code art. 3.53, 5 6 (Supp. 1956).
'Id. at 5 2B.
s Id. at 5 7. That term is specifically limited. The amount of credit accident and
health is limited to such "proportion to the unpaid balance of the loan as shall be ap-
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Section 7 requires a written application and section 13 provides
civil and criminal penalties for the collection of excessive premiums
-a penalty more severe than the penalty for usury.
Section 6 has been specifically singled out for attack as permitting
"legalized usury"; however, sections 4 and 10 are equally important
to a discussion of that question. Sections 4, 6, and 10 are worded
as follows:
Section 4. BORROWER TO HAVE CHOICE OF INSURER AND
AGENT.-No lender or lender agent shall hereafter require as a condi-
tion for the making of a loan that the borrower purchase either credit
life or credit health and accident insurance from such lender, lender
agent or any insurer represented by them. It shall be permissible for
such lender or lender agent to require of a borrower such credit life or
credit health and accident insurance or both as a condition for making
the loan, if, and only if, the borrower is given the option to purchase
such insurance from any insurer or insurance agent of his own choice.
It is the intent of this section to prohibit coercion of insurance and to
preserve to each citizen the right to choose his own insurer and insur-
ance agent."
Section 6. COMMISSIONS NOT DEEMED INTEREST; CONTIN-
GENT COMMISSIONS.-Commissions received by lenders, lender
agents and insurance agents from insurers for the writing of credit in-
surance complying with the terms of this article, the maximum rates
promulgated by the Board, and rules and regulations of the Board of
Insurance Commissioners, shall be considered for all purposes as com-
pensation for services rendered to such insurer and shall not be taken
to be an interest charge on the money borrowed; provided, however,
should such commissions be in excess of any maximum filed hereunder,
then such commissions shall be deemed to be an interest charge on
the money borrowed. No agreements by insurers with any of its agents
shall permit contingent commissions based on loss experience."
Section 10. EXCESSIVE RATES DEEMED INTEREST; REPORT
AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.-Any rate, premium, or assessment
charged and collected by an insurer, insurance agent, or lender agent
in excess of the rate, premium, or assessment set out in said insurer's
proved by the Board." In addition, the Board must approve all policies as to form and has
general regulatory power "to carry out the spirit and purposes of this article." Id. at S 9.
Section 2 of the regulations dated April 23, 1956, permitted credit insurance in excess of
the amount of loan obligation it was protecting. This was contrary to the spirit and pur-
pose of the act and the concept and definition of credit insurance and has been changed in
the regulations since February 24, 1958. The underlying principle of credit life insurance
is to provide automatic liquidation of indebtedness in the event of death; credit accident
and health provides periodic installment payments on the debt in the event that the debtor
is disabled through accident or illness. Thus, lenders and insurers who sold excessive credit
insurance also seized the opportunity to sell credit disability insurance in excess of the
amount of the installment payment. See Cade, The Fundamental Issues of Consumer Credit
Insurance, No. 385 Ins. L.J. 76 (1955).
IId. at S 4.
14Id. at S 6.
1958]
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rate schedule on file with the Board, and in force at the time, is de-
clared to be an exaction of interest on the money borrowed. It shall be
the duty of the Board to report forthwith to the Attorney General
of Texas any facts coming to its attention indicating that such excess
rate, premium, or assessment has been charged and collected, and he
in turn shall deliver such evidence to the proper District or County
Attorney for proper legal proceedings under the usury laws, or him-
self bring such proceedings.15
Thus, section 6 does not stand alone even though the tacit as-
sumption of the argument against its validity is that it does. Such
an assumption is required for that argument. However, it is submit-
ted that the remainder of the act and regulations, properly admin-
istered, render it impossible for section 6 to permit usury. Consti-
tutionality of the act must be judged by what it permits. Pursuing
this analysis, the Credit Insurance Act permits the following:
(1) The lender agent can require as security only such credit in-
surance as the act permits (Section 4) ;
(2) The compulsory purchase of such insurance from the lender
agent or any other agent may not be made a condition pre-
cedent to the loan (Section 4);
(3) The consideration or premium for such insurance if pur-
chased must be "reasonable and just" (Section 2);
(4) The only insurance permitted is that which is limited in
term and in an amount reasonably related to the debtor's
obligation.
Section 6 merely states that the commissions to the lender agent
for writing such insurance shall not be deemed interest and shall
be considered for all purposes as compensation for services rendered
to the insurer, provided such commissions are not in excess of any
maximum fixed by the Board. Inasmuch as the commissions are
paid by the insurance company to the lender, it is somewhat
difficult to see how a borrower, who has not paid the commissions,
could allege that the payment of the commission in any way in-
volved the exaction of interest from him.
The premiums, however, assume a different status since they
are paid by the borrower. The courts are primarily interested in
sums actually expended by the borrower and in whether or not
such sums involve compensation for the borrowed money. The
constitutional provision against usury does not contemplate that
all ancillary contracts made between borrower and lender must
be considered when determining interest. Accepting the definition
151d. at 1 10.
[Vol. 12
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of interest as being compensation for the loan, use or forbearance
of money, a bona fide insurance premium paid for credit insurance
would not be interest. It is significant that insurance premiums
are not mentioned in section 6. However, the regulations do limit
the amount of the commission that may be paid to a lender out
of premiums. In a sense, this offers greater protection to the bor-
rower than did the common law, i.e., reasonable insurance premiums
are not interest, but commissions paid to the lender agent in ex-
cess of the maximum allowed by the Board are interest, whether
compulsory or not. They would not have been at common law.1"
Section 6 does not foreclose inquiry as to the compulsory nature
of the insurance, nor as to compliance with sections 4 and 10. The
lender can require such credit insurance "of a borrower," but he
cannot compel the purchase of such insurance from himself or any
other agent without violating the act.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Consideration must be given the constitutional limitation on
the Legislature with respect to interest, the Legislature's power
and duty to provide appropriate penalties for the same, and its
police power which includes the power to regulate the insurance
business. Section 11 of article 16 of the Constitution of Texas
provides:
All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum per
annum, shall be deemed usurious, and the first Legislature after this
amendment is adopted, shall provide appropriate pains and penalties to
prevent the same; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate
shall not exceed six per centum per annum."
It is settled beyond question that the Legislature has the general
power to regulate the insurance business."8 This includes establishing
the premium rate and the compensation or commission paid to
agents. Indeed, the agents' compensation bears a direct relation
to the rate of premium fixed by the state, which is the only rate
for which the parties may contract.1 ' To allow the parties to an
"6 Cases cited note 8 supra.
1
7Tex. Const. art. 16, S 11 (1955).
is Associated Employers Lloyds v. Dillingham, 262 S.W.2d $44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
error ref.; Alamo Express, Inc. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 250 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952); Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 225 S.W.2d
240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Traders and Gen. Ins. Co., 135
S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism.
"9See note 22 supra. See also Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) (which states that
the power to regulate the insurance business is affected by due process); O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1936).
19 5 8]
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insurance contract to fix any other rate would impair or destroy the
state's regulatory system, which assures a policy of uniform and
non-discriminatory insurance rates and in which the public has a
paramount interest. "' To retain the state's regulatory system and
insure that only one rate is offered by the insurer to members of the
public in the same class, section 6 was not restricted merely to
creating a prima facie presumption that a commission charged
is reasonable. Such a system would permit juries to fix commission
rates merely by finding the same to be interest; thus, the presump-
tion was made conclusive.
Close analysis reveals that insurance premiums are fundamentally
different from the charges and expenses incurred in connection
with a loan. This distinction justifies different treatment by the
Legislature which provided a conclusive presumption of reasonable-
ness of the former, while there is only a prima facie presumption
of reasonableness as to the latter. The distinction arises in the de-
finiteness in ascertaining a reasonable cost. The insurance rate is
based upon actuarial computations and a reasonable return to
the lender. This contrasts with the charges for expenses and ser-
vices rendered to a borrower which cannot be accurately calculated.
The cost of a security appraisal can vary with the type of security
offered, the amount of the loan, the location of the lender with
respect to the borrower, the lender's policy, and knowledge of the
borrower derived from prior transactions. Obviously, all the Legisla-
ture could do consistent with its policy that such charges for
services should be both compensatory and reasonable was to limit
these charges and create a prima facie presumption of reasonable-
ness.
III. WHAT IS INTEREST AND WHAT Is NOT INTEREST
As the only objection to the validity of the Credit Insurance
Act has been the contention that it violates the constitutional
limitation on interest, it follows that if the act does not permit
usury, the entire basis for the objection fails. Indeed, the burden
of proof is upon the opponents of constitutionality in view of the
presumption of constitutionality of any act of the Legislature.'
The problem, therefore, is to determine what is interest, what
is usury, and what is compensation which falls within neither class.
The Constitution does not define "interest." The Legislature, how-
ever, has defined interest as being "a compensation allowed by
"See note 23 supra.
9 Tex. Jur., Constitutional Law S 59 (1930).
[Vol. 12
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law or fixed by the parties to a contract for the use or forbearance,
or detention of money.""'
Usury is defined as "interest in excess of the amount allowed by
law."" There are four elements of usury: (1) there must be a
loan or forbearance; (2) the loan must be of money or something
circulating as money; (3) it must be repayable absolutely; and (4)
something must be exacted for the use or forbearance of money in
excess of, and in addition to, the interest allowed by law." There
are decisions implying that a fifth element must be added, namely,
the intent of the parties, or at least of the lender, that illegal in-
terest shall be paid and received. The courts often speak of such
an intent as being controlling in controversies respecting alleged
usury. However, a study of the cases indicates that when the courts
speak of intent, they mean that when the transaction is innocent
in form, evidence may be received to show its real nature
and to permit a jury finding that the parties intended a transaction
usurious in substance."a But, when the transaction is usurious in
substance, whether so in form or not, the penalties imposed by
law cannot be evaded by proving that the party had no evil de-
sign, unless it be further shown that the lender acting innocently
and by some mistake of fact, as by an incorrect computation, con-
tracted to receive an excess of the legal interest." Mere intention,
except in the case of a mistake of fact, cannot change the character
of a transaction necessarily usurious; neither can it taint with usury
a transaction necessarily innocent. Therefore, where a transaction
is simply a purchase and where there is no actual violation of the
usury laws, the presence or absence of an intent to violate them
is immaterial, and evidence of such intent will not be admitted."
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069 (1947).
23 Id. at art. $071. Such definitions are merely reiterations of the common-law definition.
"Annot., 46 Am. St. Rep. 178, 182 (1895). See also note 28 supra.5 Glover v. Buchman, 104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
2e Legally, one cannot say he intended to charge an amount for interest which later
proved to be excessive, although he did not intend to violate the usury law. Van Biel v.
Fordney, 79 Ala. 76 (1885); Manchester Realty Co. v. Kanehl, 130 Conn. $52, 36 A.2d
114 (1944); Jones v. Hernando Bank, 194 Miss. 474, 13 So. 2d 31 (1943); Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 173 Miss. 854, 163 So. 506 (1935); Burdon v. Unrath,
47 R.I. 226, 132 Atl. 728 (1926). This is a mistake of law; however, the decided cases dis-
tinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact, holding that an excessive interest
charge made as a result of a mistake of fact will not constitute usury because the requisite
intent to make more than permitted by statute is not present. Jefferson Standard Life
Ins. Co. v. Davis, supra.
" Smith v. Paton, 31 N.Y. 66 (1865). This would appear to be a continuation of the
general rule that the law does not concern itself with mere guilty intentions unconnected
with outward manifestation. 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law S 25 (1938). Wood v. Contin-
ental Say. & Bldg. Ass'n, 56 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933): "They [the plain-
tiffs] merely alleged that the scheme by which the defendant in error was enabled to
collect that amount of money it did collect from them was a device to charge usurious
195 8]
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IV. REASONABLE INSURANCE PREMIUMS ARE NOT INTEREST
As A MATTER OF LAW
As stated above, interest and usury must be distinguished from
forms of compensation of a fundamentally different nature. At
common law, the fact that the lender may refuse to make a loan
unless the borrower consents to enter into another transaction is
a factor independent of the loan and does not render it usurious,
if the lender receives only a fair equivalent of the consideration
which he gives."' But if the collateral bargain is merely a colorable
device by which the lender is to receive interest in addition to the
highest permitted rate of consideration for the loan, it does render
the loan usurious." Nor does the mere fact that the lender makes
profit out of the collateral transaction render the loan usurious.
Whether a collateral bargain is a mere colorable device is a question
of fact which must be submitted to a jury if there is any doubt.
The provisions of section 6 are thus merely a reiteration of the
common-law rule in Texas. Naturally if there were fraud, accident,
or mistake of fact, it might convert the collateral transaction
from one within the statute and deemed not to be usurious to
one which is not sanctioned by the statute. In that event, the pro-
tection of the statute to the lender against being declared guilty
of usury would be lost in the same manner that a violation of
the statute governing the collateral transaction would put the trans-
action itself outside the statute." A study of cases reveals that
the insurance permitted under the Credit Insurance Act is some-
what more restricted than that permitted by the common law in
a collateral transaction. In the states where the lender is permitted
to profit from a collateral transaction, it is well established that
life insurance companies as a condition precedent to making the
loan can legally require the purchase of a life insurance policy
from themselves as security for the loan. Such a requirement does
not violate the usury law, even though the total interest charged,
plus the insurance premium, exceeds the statutory maximum in-
interest. But the testimony shows that this scheme was one expressly authorized by the
statutes of the state, and therefore could not legally have been a usurious one . . ." See
also Abilene Christian College v. Wright, 1 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
£842 Tex. Jur., Usury S 40 (1936). See also Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165
S.W.2d 709 (1942); Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937); Shattuck
v. Clark, 34 S.W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref.; Huddleston v. Kempner, 21 S.W.
946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892); accord, Restatement, Contracts 5 528 (1932); 6 Williston,
Contracts 5 1687 (rev. ed. 1938).
"Glover v. Buchman, 104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
"Wood v. Continental Say. & Blkdg. Ass'n, 56 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
[Vol. 12
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terest rate.' Two standards are set: (1) that the premium charged
for the insurance must be the normal charge which would be
made in a transaction where no loan was involved; and (2) that
the amount of the insurance coverage be reasonably related to the
loan transaction."
The Texas common-law rules are the same. The earliest and
most frequently cited Texas case involving the sale of credit in-
surance in connection with a loan is Rodriguez v. R. P. Youngberg
Finance, Ltd." The loan exceeded $1,000 and would therefore be
outside the Credit Insurance Act. The court said:
Admittedly a lender may without violating the usury law make an extra
charge for any distinctly separate and additional consideration other
than the simple lending of money. Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165
S.W.2d 709 (Sup. Ct.). There can be little doubt that appellant did
receive material and substantial benefits from the "credit" insurance.
* * Therefore it seems obvious that there was a distinctly separate and
additional consideration other than the loaning of money for these pre-
miums which were collected .... There is no evidence that the premi-
ums charged were in any respect excessive for this kind of insurance,
or that appellant was in any way coerced into acquiring this insurance.
, . . Nor can it be assumed that appellee acted in bad faith in requiring
this type of insurance-in other words, that it was unnecessary as ad-
ditional protection for the loan. . . .In the absence of statutory pro-
hibition we approve the following language of the Court of General
Sessions of Delaware, in State v. Bankers Finance Corporation, 2 Terry
566, 26 A. 2d 220, loc. cit. 225, as applicable to the facts of this case:
"If a lender compel a borrower to insure in a company where the
lender will get additional commissions, we think such conduct con-
stitutes an unlawful exaction. If, on the other hand, no compulsion
whatever is used, but the selection results in an agent's commission to
the lender, whether the premium be paid by the borrower himself or
by the lender at request of the borrower, we see no reason that these
commissions should be credited to the borrower. He has no expense
in maintaining the agency and has paid but the normal manual rate.
There being in this case no evidence of any compulsion in the selection
"'Sledd v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 326, 183 S.E. 199 (1935); Morris v.
Georgia Loan, Say. & Banking Co., 109 Ga. 12, 34 S.E. 378 (1899); Washington Life Ins.
Co. v. Paterson Silk Mfg. Co., 25 N.J. Eq. 160 (1874); Homeopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Crane, 2 5 N.J. Eq. 418 (1874); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 5 5 How. Pr.
393 (N.Y. 1874); Philbrick v. Puritan Corp., 178 Okla. 489, 63 P.2d 38 (1936); Heaberlin
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 198, 171 S.E. 419 (1933); Friedman v.
Wisconsin Acceptance Corp.' 192 Wis. 58, 210 N.W. 831 (1926); Downes v. Green, 12
M. & W. 481, 52 Eng. Rep. 1287 (Ex. 1844). The English case of Downes v. Green,
supra, is particularly interesting in view of the first article of the Texas statutes, which
provides that: "The common law of England so far as it is not inconsistent with the
constitution and laws of this state, shall together with such constitution and laws be the
rule of decision, and shall continue in force until altered or repealed by the Legislature."
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1 (1947).
" Cases cited note 35 supra.3324 1 S.W.2d 81$ (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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of the company, we do not think the failure to apply the commission
to the account of the borrower constitutes any unlawful charge against
the borrower." That the question of good faith on the part of appellee
was a question of fact which was decided by the trial court adversely
to appellant is clearly demonstrated by the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in Friedman v. Wisconsin Acceptance Corp., 192
Wis. 58, 210 N.W. 831, 53 A.L.R. 758, a case decided on facts in no
material respect distinguishable from the facts here except that no part
of the commissions was received by the lender, in which it was held
that such charges were not a subterfuge and were not usurious. See also
Annotation 21 A.L.R. 876. It is unnecessary to hold that the transac-
tion here was made in good faith as a matter of law. The trial court
has in effect found that it was made in good faith and our holding is
that it does not appear otherwise as a matter of law. 4
Certainly the validity of a statute cannot be made to depend
upon its administration. In this respect and in considering the
effect of section 6, it is to be noted that section 6 does not require
the Board to set maximum commissions which may be charged.
It merely gives the Board the power to fix such maximum rates
upon its determination of the necessity for such regulation. As
previously pointed out, the power to regulate commissions is essen-
tial, but it does not follow that the power must be exercised. In
brief, the power is granted and the Board can use it if it finds
it necessary to do so. Until recently it did not find it necessary,
but under the revised regulations of February 24, 1958, the In-
surance Commission has set a maximum on these commissions
and placed them under strict regulation."" Although the com-
mission is in addition to the ten per cent interest which the lender
charges to the borrower, such commission, when not in excess of
the maximum, is not under section 6 interest charged on the money
borrowed.
Section 6 provides that "Commissions . . . complying with the
terms of this article, the maximum rates promulgated by the Board,
and rules and regulations of the Board of Insurance Commis-
sioners . . shall not be taken to be an interest charge . . . ." There-
fore, unless the commissions conform to the maximum rate pro-
mulgated by the Board, they do not come under the protection of
section 6. The contention that such commissions would be pro-
tected in the absence of Board action is without merit. This could
not be the effect of legislative action under the legislative power
to fix the rate of commissions and premiums on insurance policies.
3Id. at 820.
" Order of the State Board of Insurance, Regulations for Issuance of Credit Life
Insurance and Credit Health and Accident Insurance Policies (Feb. 24, 1958).
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CREDIT INSURANCE ACT
The rate-making function of the Insurance Department is legisla-
tive in character."6
There are many factors which must be considered in the fair
and reasonable administration of laws requiring rate fixing. Under
such administrative laws, all questions of fact are primarily for the
commission or board to determine.' Therefore, when a rate has
been prescribed under the state's regulatory authority, it is the
rate which the state has found reasonable and has established under
its legislative power. The destruction of the state's regulatory
authority could come about through judicial determinations as to
the reasonableness of insurance rates in individual cases. The courts
will not permit such collateral attacks on legislative action regulat-
ing prices." Indeed, a statute which provides that the court should
substitute its judgment for that of a commission and try matters
anew as an administrative body, substituting its findings for those
of the commission would be an unconstitutional delegation of
non-judicial powers to the judiciary.3" Where the parties contract
for credit insurance, a question of fact naturally arises as to the
reasonableness of the premium charged. The only manner in which
the legitimate lender can be protected from the accusation of taking
usury because the premium for credit insurance is unreasonable
is to have the reasonableness of the premium established by the
Legislature under its rule-making authority. This is especially true
since the lender may have no control over the premium.
Inasmuch as the Texas Credit Insurance Act does not permit
usury or interest in excess of that permitted by law, the intent
of a lender or a borrower or any other private person that it should
do so has no bearing on the constitutionality of the act of the
Legislature. Without permitting interest in excess of that allowed
by the Constitution, the Texas Credit Insurance Act cannot be an
attempt to "legalize usury." This act is a working tool, which,
if properly used, will enable the state to remove abuses and create
a wholesome atmosphere in the small-loan field.
3 Brown & Root, Inc. v. Traders and Gen. Ins. Co., 153 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) error dism.; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. Administrative Law S 38 (1942).
"
T Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co,, 126 Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935).
"Associated Employers Lloyds v. Dillingham, 262 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
error ref.; Red Arrow Freight Lines v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 225 S.W.2d 240(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Falvey v. Simms Oil Co., 92 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Minney v. Furman, Lawrence & Parker, 286 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
"Suppee v. Railroad Comm., 123 Tex. 521, 73 S.W.2d $05 (1934).
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